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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Federal Power Commission Does Not Have Jurisdiction
Over the Sale of a Developed Leasehold Interest of Gas
in Formation-Marr v. FPC
•
Independent gas producers1 erected producing wells upon certain land to extract leased mineral interests. This development of
the leasehold2 supplied geological information from which the
amount of gas reserves was estimated. The gas leasehold was then
sold to Texas Eastern Transmission Company, an interstate pipeline company that sought additional reserves. Texas Eastern applied
to the Federal Power Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to connect its transportation system to the
field.3 The FPC asserted jurisdiction over the sale of the leasehold
in order to investigate the cost aspects of the transaction. Because
the details of the sale appeared to adversely affect the ultimate
price of gas to the consumer, the FPC refused to grant the requested
certificate." On appeal, held, the Federal Power Commission does
not have jurisdiction over the sale of a developed leasehold interest
of gas in formation. 15 Marr v. FPC, 33 U.S. L. WEEK 2074 (5th Cir.
Aug. 8, 1964).
The Natural Gas Act6 is applicable to the "sale in interstate
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consump-_
tion," 7 but it expressly exempts the business of "production or
gathering" from FPC jurisdiction.8 The ultimate classification of a
transaction into one category or the other is left to the FPC and the
judiciary. At present, a direct sale of natural gas to an interstate
pipeline is within the jurisdiction of the FPC; it is not part of
production and gathering.9 But, the sale of an undeveloped leasehold
1. An "independent gas producer" produces, gathers, processes, and sells natural

gas, but neither transports it in interstate commerce nor is affiliated with any interstate .
pipeline company. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 547 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1954).
2. Development of a leasehold consists of drilling wells and bringing them into
production. An area remains undeveloped if production is not obtained, even though
exploratory or discovery wells are drilled. WILLIAMS Be MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS
61 (1957).
!I. Extension of facilities for the interstate transportation or sale of natural gas
requires approval by the FPC through the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
4. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249, 257-58 (1963).
5. "Gas in formation" refers to gas situated in fault traps or other natural geological
formations beneath the ground. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93.
6. 52 Stat. 821 (19118), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1958).
7. Natural Gas Act§ l(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
8. Ibid,
9. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 547 U.S. 672 (1954). Commentators, prior
to the Phillips decision, erroneously, but almost unanimously, believed that FPC assertion of jurisdiction over this transaction would not be sustained because Congress
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is an aspect of production and gathering and, therefore, not subject
to Commission control.10 The transaction in the present case
appears to lie between these two areas.11
Several arguments may be advanced to support FPC jurisdiction over this sale of a developed leasehold. First, the financial
aspects of the transaction closely resemble those of a direct sale
of natural gas by the independent producer to the interstate pipeline.12 The similarity between this conveyance and a direct sale of
gas, over which the FPC has jurisdiction, suggests it would be
illogical to deny FPC jurisdiction over this transaction. Second,
the FPC can always regulate this business activity indirectly.
Having jurisdiction over interstate transportation facilities, the
FPC can issue or deny certificates of public convenience and
necessity for pipeline facilities leading to the wells from which
the company is to obtain gas if the price involved in the original
transaction is determined to be excessive.13 This is true even when
the original transaction is clearly outside the Commission's jurishad not intended the economic repercussions in the industry that would follow such
a move. E.g., Berger &: Krash, The Status of the Independent Producers Under the
Natural Gas Act, 80 TEXAs L. REv. 29 (1951); Kulp, The Federal Natural Gas Act, 5
OKLA. L. REv. 128 (1952); 59 YALE L.J. 1468 (1950). But see, Comment, 17 u. CHI,
L. REv. 479 (1950); 4 MIAMI L.Q. 233 (1950). Post-Phillips discussions have been very
critical of the holding. E.g., Fulbright, The FPC Gas Producer Exemption Is in the
Consumer's Interest, 57 PUB. Um.. FOR.T. 18 (1956); Comment, 40 CoRNELL L.Q, 828
(1955); Comment, 1954 ILI.. L.F. 509; 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 874 (1956); 44 GEO. L.J. 695
(1956); 8 VAND. L. REv. 142 (1954). But see Durfee, Wisconsin and the Phillips Case,
55 PUB. Um.. FORT, 70 (1955); 54 CoLuM. L REv. 1149 (1954). For judicial development
of the holding of the Phillips decision, see note 17 infra.
IO. FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 887 U.S. 498 (1949).
11. Later in the same year, the FPC again held that it had jurisdiction in a case
factually similar to the principal case. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 80 F.P.C. 759
(1963).
12. For example, in a direct sale of gas the total price is determined by multiplying
the specific volume by an accepted price per unit of volume. In this transaction, the
same price specificity was achieved by periodic redeterminations of the gas reserves
and adjustments in the price per unit of volume. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29
F.P.C. 249, 254 (1968).
18. Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1988), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)
(1958). In addition, the FPC can condition certification of new pipeline facilities on
the price to be paid the independent producer for the gas. Natural Gas Act § 7(e),
52 Stat. 824 (1988), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d
149 (5th Cir. 1961). Unfortunately, the necessity for agreement between the company
and the Commission on the conditions for the issuance of a conditional certificate and
the consequent construction of the pipeline facilities conflicts with the providing of
adequate service to the public. Hence, it would seem that the Commission would be
in a less powerful bargaining position on the issue of the producer's price when its
only statutory authority relates to the certification of facilities than would be the case
if it could certify the construction of the pipeline with minimum delay and then
exercise direct rate-making power as between the producer and the pipeline. Cf. note
15 infra. During the rate proceeding, the Commission would have the power to order
refunds of overcharges occasioned by the producer's price and passed on to consumers
by the pipeline company. Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52 Stat. 822 (1988), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 717c(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
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diction.14 But this indirect control lends itself to evasive activities
by the pipelines, which in turn require time-consuming countermaneuvers by the FPC. Hence, indirect control is probably less
effective and efficient-or at least thought by the FPC to be less
effective and efficient-than direct control.15 Since the FPC can
already exercise ultimate control over this situation, it can be
argued that such control should be as direct and efficient as possible. Finally, there is a general trend toward expansion of FPC
regulation over the independent gas producer. It began with
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 16 and has since continued to
expand, 17 with no parallel extension of the exemption for production and gathering.
FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.,1 8 however, casts authoritative doubt on the assertions of jurisdiction by the FPC over the
transaction in the principal case. There it was held that a sale of an
undeveloped leasehold is within the express exemption to FPC
jurisdiction. Language in that opinion indicated that all activity
involving leases might fall within the express exemption, 19 and
this language formed the basis of decision in the principal case.20
However, the Panhandle case can be distinguished from the principal case because it involved an undeveloped, rather than a developed, leasehold.21 If the sale of undeveloped leases were within
14. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
15. The need to service consumers precludes a continuing battle between the
FPC and a pipeline over prices when the FPC's statutory authority is only to reject
those prices suggested by the transporter. Natural Gas Act § 4(a), 52 Stat. 822 (1938),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1958). See Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C.
249, 256 (1963).
16. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
17. FPC jurisdiction has been upheld in the following situations: (1) sales made
by a producer to an extraction plant that resells the processed residue gas, Deep South
Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957); (2) sales made to an extraction plant that
processes the gas and returns it to the producer, who then sells it to an interstate pipeline company, Argo Oil Corp., 15 F.P.C. 601 (1955); (3) sales of gas not transmitted interstate until after being stored underground for some time at a place removed from
the point of sale, Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1957); (4) gas sold
in the wellhead before reaching the final regulating valve controlled by the buyer,
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1959). See Mosburg, Regulation of
the Independent Producer by the Federal Power Commission, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 249
(196!1); Comment, Federal Regulation of Producer's Price Under the Natural Gas Act,
9 KAN. L. REv. 4!11 (1961); Comment, Federal Control Over the Independent Gas
Producer, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 690 (1957).
18. 337 U.S. 498 (1949). See text accompanying note 27 infra.
19. "We now adhere to this natural and clear meaning of the words and their
obvious expression of congressional intent. Of course leases are an essential part of
production." Id. at 505. (Emphasis added.)
20. Principal case at 2075.
21. Although other distinctions were suggested by the FPC in the principal case,
that between developed and undeveloped leaseholds is the only one having apparent
legal merit. The other distinctions were addressed to the trend of authority in the
area, to the retention by the seller of certain mineral rights, production payments, and
management of the field, and to the fact that the gas in Panhandle was destined for

•

158

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 6!1

FPC jurisdiction, the FPC could conceivably regulate the sale of
all property that possibly contains gas in formation that might
be ultimately resold in interstate commerce; but, the distinction
between developed and undeveloped leaseholds would overcome
the fear of such extensive bureaucratic control over the price of
general property transactions.22 This distinction also preserves some
meaning for the statutory exemption to FPC jurisdiction because
it permits the continued applicability of the express exemption
to the physical aspects of production and gathering. Distinguishing
developed from undeveloped leaseholds has the additional value
of not diluting the FPC's ability to carry out the aim of the Natural
Gas Act-the safeguarding of the public interest.23
Although the above distinction appears to have some practical
value, independent gas producers could condition the sale of undeveloped leaseholds upon the discovery of gas in paying quantities, and the price could be adjusted as the volume was ascertained.
Such a sale would accomplish the same economic purpose as the
sale of a developed leasehold, and yet, applying the distinction
between developed leaseholds and undeveloped leaseholds, the
transaction would be outside FPC jurisdiction; it would require
a strained construction to fit the sale of an undeveloped leasehold
within the statutory term "sale in interstate commerce of natural
gas."24 The FPC would then be forced to rely on the less effective
indirect control that can be exercised upon transactions outside
its jurisdiction.25 The facility with which the producers could
utilize this distinction to avoid direct FPC control diminishes its
value.26
The FPC may prefer to argue, in defense of its claim of jurisdiction, that Panhandle should be overruled, rather than distinguished. This argument might be favorably received because there
are indications that the present Supreme Court would not extend
the production and gathering exemption as far as did the majority
intrastate commerce. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249, 255 (196!1). This
latter fact, however, did not form any part of the holding of the Panhandle Court.
22. This fear was expressed by FPC Commissioner Woodward in his dissenting
opinion in Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 30 F.P.C. 759, 771 (1963).
23. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954). Accord, FPC
v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil
Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
24. Natural Gas Act § l(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)
(1958).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. The propensity of producers and pipelines to avoid direct FPC control is
amply demonstrated by noting the activity of Texas Eastern in the principal transaction. At first, there was a direct sale of gas to Texas Eastern. When it became apparent
that the FPC was going to question the price of the transaction by asserting jurisdiction,
the form of the transaction took the shape of a sale of a leasehold in order to avoid
direct FPC price control. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249, 250•51 (196!1) .
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in the Panhandle decision.27 It was, perhaps, this prospect of reinterpretation of legislative intent that prompted the FPC to assert jurisdiction at this particular time.
The foregoing discussion of the "legal" aspects of the problem as
articulated by the judiciary indicates that the power asserted by
the FPC would probably be sustained on appeal to the Supreme
Court, with Panhandle being either distinguished or overruled.
However, other considerations indicate that the FPC may have
chosen an inopportune time to assert jurisdiction over the sa~ of
developed leaseholds of gas in formation. Congress has been disturbed by past developments resulting in the expansion of FPC
control over the independent producer. When the FPC indicated
in 1948 that it was going to assert a broader jurisdiction, resulting
in more direct control over the independent producers,28 Congress
responded with a bill which would have arrested the growth of
FPC jurisdiction over such producers.29 But, that enactment was
vetoed by President Truman in 1950.30 After the Phillips decision
in 1954, congressional resentment of what it considered to be a
mistaken conception of the aim of the production and gathering
exemption81 manifested itself in another bill designed to restrict
FPC jurisdiction.82 President Eisenhower vetoed that bill in 1956.88
27. In Panhandle there was a dissent by Mr. Justice Black in which Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred. Their basic position is that the exemption must be construed narrowly because effective FPC control, as contemplated by the Natural Gas Act, requires
jurisdiction over this type of transaction. FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S.
498, 516 (1949) (dissenting opinion). This view would probably be supported by a
majority of the present Court. In addition to Justices Black and Douglas, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren has indicated his support of a construction of the Natural Gas Act
favoring restrictive federal control of the natural gas industry. FPC v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. I (1961). Mr. Justice Brennan has endorsed similar views.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963); Sunray MidContinent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960). To total a majority, Mr. Justice Goldberg can be counted by virtue of his concern for the protection of the consuming
public by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1140, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 567, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949).
29. H.R. 1758, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). This bill would have specifically
exempted from FPC jurisdiction any arm's-length sale made by a producer prior to
the delivery of the gas to interstate transmission facilities.
30. H.R. Doc. No. 555, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). The veto was designed to protect
the public by preventing excessive and unreasonable prices in the gas industry.
31. H.R. REP. No. 992, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. REP. No. 1219, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955).
!!2. H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). This legislation defined "sale in interstate commerce of natural gas" to exclude sales made prior to the entrance of the
gas into interstate transmission facilities. For an excellent detailed case study of this
bill, see READ, MAcDONALD &: FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 559-636 (1959).
!!3. H.R. Doc. No. 342, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). President Eisenhower indicated
that he would have approved the legislation under other circumstances, but he was
prevented from endorsing the measure by the gas industry's "arrogant" lobbying while
the measure was being considered by Congress.
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With the major advocates of restrictive legislation still in Congress
and likely to remain there for some time, 34 and with a man in the
Presidency who issued the Senate Report on the 1949 bill 35 and
authored a blistering denunciation of the Phillips holding in
1954,36 the time seems ripe for another effort to give the production
and gathering exemption the effect which Congress has long felt
was originally intended.
Three factors militate against the likelihood of effective legislatiqn in this area: (1) the probable reluctance of the President to
give support to a measure which might raise a politically embarrassing cry of favoritism, (2) the difficulty of "evicting" an
agency that has already ensconced itself in an area of regulation,
and (3) the highly speculative nature of any prediction of congressional sentiment. Nevertheless, oilmen are encouraged by their
legislative strength, and a veto by President Johnson would seem
unlikely, however strongly he disassociates himself from such a
measure in its earlier stages. If such a bill should be passed and
signed into law, it would seem that the FPC's decision to focus
on the jurisdictional problem in the first place may have been a
chronological error which will jeopardize more effective FPC control over the independent gas producer in the future.

34. Still in Congress are the co-sponsors of the 1955 bill. Representative Oren
Harris and Senator J. William Fulbright, both Democrats of Arkansas. Representative
Harris was first elected in 1940, and has been re-elected eleven times since. Senator
Fulbright's fourth term began in 1962, which insures his presence in Congress until the
First Session of the Ninety-first Congress.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. "The basic proposition enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court . . . is as clear
as it is shocking and as alarming as it is far-reaching . . . . The majority decision flies
in the face of congressional intent and of past court decisions. There can be no doubt
that Congress never intended the federal regulation of natural gas at the wellhead.
The debates on the subject can be searched in vain for any contrary indication."
Johnson, TJe Phillips Case Decision and the Public Interest, 54 PuB. UTIL. FORT.
473-74 (1954).

